In wireless sensor networks (WSNs), the Eschenauer-Gligor (EG) key pre-distribution scheme is a widely recognized way to secure communications. Although the connectivity properties of secure WSNs with the EG scheme have been extensively investigated, few results address physical transmission constraints. These constraints reflect real-world implementations of WSNs in which two sensors have to be within a certain distance from each other to communicate. In this paper, we present the first zero-one laws for connectivity in WSNs employing the EG scheme under transmission constraints. These laws improve recent results [10, 11] significantly, are sharp, and help specify the critical transmission ranges for connectivity. Our analytical findings, which are also confirmed via numerical experiments, provide precise guidelines for the design of secure WSNs in practice. The application of our theoretical results to frequency hopping of wireless networks is discussed in some detail.
INTRODUCTION
The Eschenauer-Gligor key pre-distribution scheme [7] is regarded as a typical approach to secure communications in wireless sensor networks (WSNs). In this scheme (referred to as the EG scheme hereafter), each sensor is independently assigned the same number of distinct cryptographic keys selected uniformly at random from a key pool before deployment. After deployment, any two sensors establish a link between them, if they share at least one key.
Connectivity in secure WSNs employing the EG scheme has been extensively studied in the literature [2, 10, 11, 17, 18, 22] . However, most existing research [2, 17, 18, 22] unrealistically assumes unconstrained sensor-to-sensor communications; i.e., any two sensors can communicate regardless of the distance between them. Only two recent results [10, 11] take transmission constraints into consideration, but do not provide zero-one laws for connectivity.
In this paper, we establish the first and also sharp zero-one laws for connectivity in WSNs using the EG scheme under practical transmission constraints. We present significantly improved conditions for asymptotic connectivity over those of Krishnan et al. [10] and Krzywdziński and Rybarczyk [11] , and also demonstrate that as the parameters move further away from these conditions, the network rapidly becomes asymptotically disconnected. Our results provide useful guidelines for dimensioning the EG scheme and adjusting sensor transmission power to ensure network connectivity. Moreover, our zero-one laws enable us to determine the critical transmission ranges for connectivity. Intuitively, as the transmission range surpasses (resp., falls below) the critical value and grows (resp., declines) further, the network immediately enters an asymptotically connected (resp., disconnected) state.
To model transmission constraints, we use the popular disk model [8, [12] [13] [14] 20] , in which each sensor's transmission area is a disk with a uniform distance as its radius; i.e., two sensors have to be within the radius distance to communicye directly. The network area in our analysis is either a torus or a square. The square accounts for the real-world boundary effect whereby some transmission region of a sensor close to the network boundary may falls outside the network field. In contrast, the torus eliminates the boundary effect.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the system model. Section 3 presents the main results, leading to the discussion of critical transmission ranges in Section 4. Afterwards, we explain the practicality of theorems' conditions in Section 5. We provide numerical experiments in Section 6. In Section 7, we discuss the application of our results to frequency hopping in detail. Section 8 reviews related work; and Section 9 concludes the paper. The Appendix contains the zero-law proofs and the sketch of the (simpler) one-law proofs.
SYSTEM MODEL
In a WSN with size n and sensor set V ={v 1 ,v 2 ,. . .,v n }, the EG scheme independently assigns a set of K n distinct cryptographic keys, which are selected uniformly at random from a pool of P n keys, to each sensor node. The set of keys of each sensor is called the key ring and is denoted by S x for sensor v x . The EG scheme is modeled by a random key graph [10, 17, 22] , denoted by G RKG (n, K n , P n ) in which an edge exists between two nodes 1 v x and v y if and only if they possess at least one common key; i.e., the event [S x ∩ S y = ∅], denoted by K xy , holds. As for the sensor distribution, we consider that the n nodes are independently and uniformly deployed in a network area A. The disk model induces a random geometric graph [8, 10, 11, 13, 14, 20] , denoted by G RGG (n, r n , A), in which an edge exists between two sensors if and only if their distance is no greater than r n . In a secure WSN using the EG scheme under the disk model, two sensors v x and v y establish a direct link between them if and only if they share at least one key and are within distance r n . We denote the event establishing this direct link by E xy . If we let graph G(n, θ n , A) model such a WSN, it is straightforward to see G(n, θ n , A) is the intersection of random key graph G RKG (n, K n , P n ) and random geometric graph G RGG (n, r n , A); namely, G(n, θ n , A) = G RKG (n, K n , P n ) ∩ G RGG (n, r n , A), where parameters K n , P n and r n are together represented by θ n . Also, if we let region A be either a torus T or a square S, each with a unit area, we obtain the two graphs G(n, θ n , T ) = G RKG (n, K n , P n ) ∩ G RGG (n, r n , T ), and G(n, θ n , S) = G RKG (n, K n , P n ) ∩ G RGG (n, r n , S).
We let p s be the probability of key sharing between two sensors and note that p s is also the edge probability in random key graph G RKG (n, K n , P n ). It holds that p s = P[K xy ] = P[S x ∩ S y = ∅]. Clearly, if P n < 2K n , then p s = 1. If P n ≥ 2K n , as shown in previous work [2, 17, 22] , we have p s = 1− Pn−Kn Kn Pn Kn . If P n ≥ 2K n , by [3, Lemma 6] , it further holds that p s ≤ K n 2 /P n .
By [24, Lemma 8] , (1) implies that if K n 2 /P n = o(1), then
1 The terms sensor and node are interchangeable.
We will frequently use (1) and (2) throughout the paper.
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Let p e be the probability that a link exists between two sensors in the WSN modeled by graph G(n, θ n , A); i.e., p e is the edge probability in G(n, θ n , A). It holds that p e = P[E xy ]. When A is the torus T , clearly p e equals πr n 2 · p s ; and if K n 2 /P n = o(1), then p e ∼ πr n 2 · K n 2 /P n by (2). When A is the square S, it is a simple matter to show p e ≤ πr n 2 · p s and p e ≥ (1 − 2r n ) 2 · πr n 2 · p s , yielding p e ∼ πr n 2 · p s if r n = o(1). Therefore, on S, if r n = o(1) and K n 2 /P n = o(1), we further obtain p e ∼ πr n 2 · K n 2 /P n in view of (2). In addition to random key graphs and random geometric graphs, the Erdős-Rényi graph [6] has also been extensively studied. An Erdős-Rényi graph G ER (n, p n ) is defined on a set of n nodes such that any two nodes establish an edge in between independently with probability p n . As already shown in the literature [2, 17, 18, 22] , random key graph G RKG (n, K n , P n ) and Erdős-Rényi graph G ER (n, p n ) have similar connectivity properties when they are matched through edge probabilities; i.e. when p s = p n . Hence, it would be tempting to exploit this analogy and conclude that connectivity in G(n, θ n , A) (i.e., G RKG (n, K n , P n ) ∩ G RGG (n, r n , A)) is similar to that of G ER (n, p n ) ∩ G RGG (n, r n , A), which was recently established [15] . However tempting, such heuristic approaches do not work as graphs G ER (n, p s ) and G RKG (n, K n , P n ) (and their respective intersections) are quite different. For instance, in G ER (n, p s ), for any three nodes v x , v y and v z , the event that v x has edges with both v y and v z , is independent of the event that v y and v z has an edge between them. However, in G RKG (n, K n , P n ), these two events are not independent from each other, since the event that v x has edges with both v y and v z means that the key rings S y and S z of v y and v z respectively both have intersections with the key ring S x of v x . This has an impact on whether S y and S z intersects. In fact, it has been formally proven [3, 22] that graphs G ER (n, p s ) and G RKG (n, K n , P n ) exhibit different characteristics in terms of properties including clustering coefficient, number of triangles, etc.
THE MAIN RESULTS
We detail the main results below. The notation "ln" stands for the natural logarithm function.
Connectivity in a Secure WSN on a Torus
Theorem 1 presents a zero-one law for connectivity in G(n, θ n , T ), which models a secure WSN working under the EG scheme and the disk model on a unit torus.
Theorem 1 Let graph G(n, θ n , T ) be the intersection of random key graph G RKG (n, K n , P n ) and random ge-2 We use the standard Landau asymptotic notation o(·), O(·), ω(·), Ω(·), Θ(·) and ∼; in particular, for two positive functions f1(n) and f2(n), the relation f1(n) ∼ f2(n) means limn→∞ f1(n)/f2(n) = 1. ometric graph G RGG (n, r n , T ) on a unit torus T , where there exist some µ n = ω(1) and constant c 1 such that
for all n sufficiently large. For all n, let the sequence α n be defined through
Then
Remark 1 Under (3), we obtain
Pn in (4) asymptotically equals the edge probability in graph G(n, θ n , T ).
Connectivity in a Secure WSN on a Square
Theorem 2 gives a zero-one law for connectivity in G(n, θ n , S), which models a secure WSN working under the EG scheme and the disk model on a unit square.
Theorem 2 Let graph G(n, θ n , S) be the intersection of random key graph G RKG (n, K n , P n ) and random geometric graph G RGG (n, r n , S) on a unit square S, where there exist some constants c 2 > 0, 0 < c 3 < 1, c 4 > 0 and ν n = o(1) such that
for all n sufficiently large. Assume that
Pn · n 1/3 ln n either is bounded for all n or converges to ∞ as n → ∞, and for all n let the sequence α n be defined through
for
Remark 2 Under (5), we have
If it further holds r n = o(1) (this is true with confined α n ), then as established in Section 2, πr n 2 · Kn 2 Pn in (6) asymptotically equals the edge probability in graph G(n, θ n , S).
CRITICAL TRANSMISSION RANGES

The Critical Transmission Range for Connectivity in a Secure WSN on a Unit Torus
By Theorem 1, under condition (3), we can determine the critical transmission range r * n (T ) for connectivity in a secure WSN on a unit torus modeled by graph G(n, θ n , T ) through
inducing the following expression of r * n (T ):
By (7), it is clear that with n fixed, r * n (T ) decreases as
Pn increases. This is expected since as mentioned in Remark 1 after Theorem 1,
Pn asymptotically equals the probability that two sensors share at least one key; and πr n 2 ·
Kn
2
Pn asymptotically equals the edge probability in G(n, θ n , T ). As the probability of key sharing increases, sensors can reduce their transmission ranges to maintain network connectivity.
We explain r * n (T ) = o(1), which is anticipated as the node density n grows to ∞.
, where µ n = ω(1), it follows that
n , which along with (7) leads to r * n (T ) = o(1).
The Critical Transmission Range for Connectivity in a Secure WSN on a Unit Square
By Theorem 2, under condition (5), we can determine the critical transmission range r * n (S) for connectivity in a secure WSN on a unit square modeled by graph G(n, θ n , S) through
so r * n (S) is specified by
First, we show that for fixed and sufficiently large n, the critical transmission range r * n (S) decreases as Pn increases by (9). Second, we show that the critical transmission range r * n (S) = o(1), which is anticipated as the node density n grows to ∞. From condition (5), for all n sufficiently large, we have
c2 2 ln n . This implies that in the case
Pn is Θ ln n n . The second case of (8), namely
1/3 ln n , and condition
Pn is Θ ln n n in (8). This fact and condition
Third, we relate the critical transmission ranges of the unit square S and torus T , namely r * n (S) ≥ r * n (T ) for all n sufficiently large. Intuitively, this relationships is caused by the boundary effects of S. Specifically, two sensors close to opposite edges of the square may be unable to establish a link on the square S but may have a link in between on the torus T because of possible wrap-around connections on the torus. In view of (7) and (9), to prove r * n (S) ≥ r * n (T ), we only need to show for all n sufficiently large that (i) ln Pn is of the order of
Kn 2 ln n , for
To prove this corollary, we recall that
For the case
Condition (5) 
Condition (5) Kn 2 ln n = a, it is a simple matter to check that such condition means for arbitrary ǫ > 0,
Example values of Pn satisfying (14) are c 6 n −a (ln n) c7 , c 8 n −a (ln n) c9 (ln n ln n) c10 , where c 6 , c 7 , c 8 , c 9 and c 10 are all arbitrary constants (of course, the coefficients c 6 and c 8 should be positive).
Corollary 1 enables us to compare our results with the best known to date (viz., Section 8), where the upper
Pn ln n n are 8 and 2π, respectively [10, 11] . Note that phase transitions are not observed for the critical range r * n (T ) of a torus T .
PRACTICALITY
In practical implementations of WSNs, K n controls the number of keys in each sensor's memory, and should be small [7] compared to both n and P n due to limited memory and computational capability of sensors.
Practicality of the Theorem 1 Conditions
By (3), we obtain constraints (i)
n with µ n = ω(1), and
ln n ln ln n . All these contraints (i), (ii) and (iii) hold in real-world WSN applications.
Practicality of the Theorem 2 Conditions
We first discuss the relationship enforced between P n and K n by (5). It is a simple matter to see (5) is equivalent to the combination of (iv)
ln n both for all n sufficiently large. We then derive the constraint on P n . From condition (5), we obtain c 2 Pn ln n n c 3 ≤ ν n Pn ln n , and c 2
Pn ln n n c 3 ≤ c4Pn n ln n , both for all n sufficiently large. The former constraint leads to ν n ≥ c2 ln n n c 3 /2 , which with ν n = o(1) can be easily satisfied by finding suitable ν n (e.g., ν n = c2 ln n n c 3 /3 ) in view of c 3 > 0. It is easy to see that the latter constraint yields (vi) P n ≥ c 2 2 c 4 −2 n 2−c3 (ln n) 3 , for all n sufficiently large.
We now present the constraint K n . From condition (vi) and
To explain the practicality of (5), it suffices to show constraints (iv)-(vii) above are all satisfied in practice. As long as c 2 , c 4 > 0 and 0 < c 3 < 1 hold, constants c 2 , c 3 and c 4 can be specified arbitrarily. For c 3 close to 1, we know that by (vi), the key pool size P n can be the node number n multiplied by a small fractional power order of n; and by (vii), the key ring size K n can have a small fractional power order of n. These K n and P n are practical. In addition, the condition that
Pn · n 1/3 ln n either is bounded for all n or converges to ∞ as n → ∞ is imposed to avoid the degenerate situation where as n → ∞, the sequence Kn 2 Pn · n 1/3 ln n does not approach to ∞ yet has a subsequence tending to ∞.
In particular, for P n = Θ n 1+ε1 and K n = Θ n ε2 with ε 1 and ε 2 satisfying 0 < ε 1 < 1 and ε1 2 < ε 2 < ε 1 , we can ensure (iv)-(vii) with suitably selected c 2 , c 3 and c 4 ; i.e., (5) holds. Such values of P n and K n are very practical with ε 1 and ε 2 arbitrarily small. We set c 3 > 1 + ε 1 − 2ε 2 , and specify c 2 and c 4 appropriately A = S, P = 10, 000 and K = 45 A = T , P = 10, 000 and K = 37 A = S, P = 10, 000 and K = 37
Figure 1: A plot of the empirical probability that graph G(n, K, P, r, A) (i.e., G(n, θ, A)) is connected as a function of r with n = 2, 000, where A is either the unit torus T or the unit square S.
(recall that 0 < c 3 < 1 and c 2 , c 4 > 0 also have to be hold as conditions in Theorem 2). As (vi) and (vii) are implied by (5), which is equivalent to the combination of (iv) and (v), we only need to show (iv) and (v) as follows. For P n = Θ n 1+ε1 and K n = Θ n ε2 , with ε 2 < ε 1 , then Kn Pn = Θ n −1+ε2−ε1 , so (iv) holds for arbitrary constant c 4 . Moreover, due to 2ε 2 > ε 1 and c 3 > 1 + ε 1 − 2ε 2 , then
for all n sufficiently large with arbitrary constant c 2 ; and because of 1
ln n for all n sufficiently large after we find suitable ν n = o(1); e.g., ν n = Θ n −(1+ε1−2ε2)/3 . Therefore, we have demonstrated both (iv) and (v), thus validating (5).
NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS
We present numerical simulation in the non-asymptotic regime to support our asymptotic results. We write graph G(n, θ n , A) as G(n, K n , P n , r n , A). In Figure 1 , we depict the probability that graph G(n, K, P, r, A) (i.e., G(n, θ, A)) is connected, where A is either the unit torus T or the unit square S; and the subscript n is removed since we fix the number of nodes at n = 2, 000 in all experiments. For each pair (A, K, P, r), we generate 500 independent samples of G(n, K, P, r, A) and count the number of times that the obtained graphs are connected. Then the count divided by 500 becomes the empirical probability for connectivity. As illustrated, we observe the evident threshold behavior in the probability that G(n, K, P, r, A) is connected as such probability transitions from zero to one as r varies slightly from a certain value.
APPLICATION IN FREQUENCY HOPPING
Frequency hopping is a classic approach for transmitting wireless signals by switching a carrier among different frequency channels. Frequency hopping offers improved communication resistance to narrowband interference, jamming attacks, and signal interception by eavesdroppers. It also enables more efficient bandwidth utilization than fixed-frequency transmission [9] . For these reasons, military radio systems, such as HAVE QUICK and SINCGARS [1], use frequency hopping extensively. A typical method of implementing frequency hopping is for the sender and receiver to first agree on a secret seed and a pseudorandom number generator (PRNG). Then the seed is input to the PRNG by both the sender and the receiver to produce a sequence of pseudo-random frequencies, each of which is used for communication in a time interval [9] .
We consider a wireless network of n nodes where nodes establish shared secret seeds for frequency hopping as follows. Each node uniformly and independently selects K n secret seeds out of a secret pool consisting of P n secret seeds. Two nodes can communicate with each other via frequency hopping if and only if they share at least one secret seed and are within each other's transmission range. Two nodes can derive a unique seed from the shared seeds in several ways. For example, the unique seed could be the cryptographic hash of the concatenated seeds shared between two nodes [5] . Alternately, if two nodes u and v share a seed k uv (which might also be shared by other pairs of nodes), they can establish a probabilistically unique secret seed H(u, v, k uv ), where the two node identities are ordered and H is an entropy-preserving cryptographic hash function.
The above way of bootstrapping seeds has the following advantages. First, without knowledge of a PRNG seed, an adversary cannot predict in advance the frequency that two nodes will use. In addition, each communicating pair of nodes can generate a secret seed that differs from the seed that another nearby node pair uses. Then it is also likely that distinct communicating node pairs located in the same vicinity utilize different frequencies. Thus, without any additional coordination protocol to avoid using the same frequency, distinct communicating node pairs nearby could work simultaneously without causing co-channel interference. Now we construct a graph G f based on the above scenario. Each of the n wireless nodes represents a node in G f . There exists an edge between two nodes in G f if and only if they can communicate with each other via frequency hopping; i.e., they share a secret seed and are in communication range with each other. Therefore, if all n nodes are uniformly and independently deployed in a network area A, which is either a unit torus T or a unit square S, and all nodes have the same transmission range r n , then G f is exactly G(n, θ n , T ) when A = T and G(n, θ n , S) when A = S. Our zero-one laws on connectivity of G(n, θ n , T ) and G(n, θ n , S), allow us to find the network parameters under which G f is connected. This provides useful guideline for the design of large-scale wireless networks with frequency hopping. for graph G(n, θ n , S), the intersection of random key graph G RKG (n, K n , P n ) and random geometric graph G RGG (n, r n , A), where r * n (S) is the critical transmission range for connectivity in G(n, θ n , S). ln n . They further investigate connectivity in graph G(n, θ n , S). In practical WSNs, K n is expected to be several orders of magnitude smaller than P n , so it often holds that
RELATED WORK
ln n , which is not addressed in the two work above [16, 23] and is addressed in our theorems. Recently, for graph G(n, θ n , S), Krzywdziński and Rybarczyk [11] and Krishnan et al.
[10] obtain connectivity results, covering the case of
We elaborate their theoretical findings below and explain that our results significantly improve theirs. Krzywdziński and Rybarczyk [11] 
Pn ≥ 2π ln n n with K n = ω(1) and
3 An event occurs almost surely if its probability approaches to 1 as n → ∞.
is almost surely connected. Both only provide upper bounds on lim
, with one being 8 and the other being 2π, where r * n (S) is the critical transmission range for connectivity in G(n, θ n , S). In this paper, we determine the exact value of this limit by deriving r * n (S). As illustrated in Figure 2, Pn ln n . The curve of the exact values is based on our result (10) in Section 4.
For random key graph G RKG (n, K n , P n ), Blackburn and Gerke [2], Rybarczyk [17] , and Yagan and Makowski [22] establish zero-one laws for its connectivity. In particular, Rybarczyk's result is that with K n ≥ 2 for all n sufficiently large and , then graph G RKG (n, K n , P n ) is almost surely connected (resp., disconnected) if lim n→∞ α n = ∞ (resp., lim n→∞ α n = −∞). Rybarczyk [18] also shows zero-one laws for k-connectivity, where k-connectivity means that the graph remains connected despite the removal of any (k − 1) nodes.
Random geometric graph G RGG (n, r n , A) has been widely studied due to its application to wireless networks. Gupta and Kumar [8] show that when A is a unit-area disk D and πr n 2 = ln n+αn n , G RGG (n, r n , D) is almost surely connected if and only if lim n→∞ α n = ∞. Penrose [13] explores k-connectivity in G RGG (n, r, A), where A is a d-dimensional unit cube with d ≥ 2. For A being the unit torus T , he obtains that with ρ n denoting the minimum r n to ensure k-connectivity in G RGG (n, r n , T ), where k ≥ 1, then the probability that πρ n 2 is at most ln n + (k − 1) ln ln n − ln[(k − 1)!] + α asymptotically converges to e −e −α . Li et al. [12] prove that with k ≥ 2, to have graph G RGG (n, r, S) asymptotically k-connected with probability at least e −e −α for some α, a sufficient condition is that the term πr n 2 is at least ln n + (2k − 3) ln ln n − 2 ln[(k − 1)!] + 2α; and a necessary condition is that πr n 2 is no less than Wan et al. [20] determine the exact formula of r n such that graph G RGG (n, r, S) or G RGG (n, r n , D) is asymptotically k-connected with probability e −e −α , where as noted above, D is a disk of unit area.
CONCLUSION
We establish the first and sharp zero-one laws for connectivity in WSNs employing the widely-used EschenauerGligor key pre-distribution scheme under transmission constraints. Such zero-one laws significantly improve recent results [10, 11] in the literature. Our theoretical findings are confirmed via numerical experiments, and are applied to frequency hopping of wireless networks.
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Lemma 2 In graph G Poisson (n, θ n , A), let I x be the event that node v x is isolated, and D rn (v x ) be the intersection of A and the disk centered at positionv x ∈ A with radius r n . We have
and with φ u denoting P K xj ∩ K yj | (|S xy | = u) , where u = 0, 1, . . . , K n , then for u = 1, 2, . . . , K n ,
and
with φ 0 meaning φ u when u = 0.
Lemma 3 Under (3) and (4), for all n sufficiently large, with α n < 0, we obtain πr n 2 n · Kn 2 Pn ≤ ln n, r n = o(1), and πr n 2 p s n = ln n + α n − O(1).
Lemma 4 Under (5) and (6), we have the following: ln 
it holds that δ n = α n ± O(1).
Lemma 5 If P n ≥ 3K n , then for any three distinct nodes v x , v y and v z and for any u = 0, 1, . . . , K n ,
Lemma 6 In graph G Poisson (n, θ n , T ) under conditions (3) and (4) with |α n | = O(ln ln n), then
Lemma 7 In graph G Poisson (n, θ n , S) under conditions (5) and (6) with |α n | = O(ln ln n), then
Lemma 8 For A being T under conditions (3) and (4) with |α n | = O(ln ln n), or A being S under conditions (5) and (6) also with |α n | = O(ln ln n), then with m denoting n − n 1 2 +c0 , where c 0 is an arbitrary constant with 0 < c 0 < 1 2 , it holds that P [ G(n, θ n , A) has no isolated node. ] , r n , T ) , where G ER (n, p n ) is an Erdős-Rényi graph; and G RGG (n, r n , T ) is a random geometric graph on a unit torus T . Let the sequence ν n for all n be defined through πr n 2 p n = ln n + ν n n .
Then as n → ∞,
Lemma 10 ([15, Theorem 2.5 and Proposition 8.5]). Consider graph G ER (n, p n ) ∩ G RGG (n, r n , S ) with p n = o 1 ln n , where G ER (n, p n ) is an Erdős-Rényi graph; and G RGG (n, r n , S) is a random geometric graph on a unit square S. With p n · n 1/3 ln n either being bounded for all n or converging to ∞ as n → ∞, let the sequence ν n for all n be defined through 
(22)
ln n , then there exists p n with
such that for any topology A and any monotone increasing graph property 4 P,
B. ESTABLISHING THE ZERO-LAWS
We first explain the basic ideas of the proofs.
B.1 Basic Ideas of the Proofs
4 A graph property is called monotone increasing if it holds under the addition of edges in a graph.
B.1.1 Poissonization and de-Poissonization
We demonstrate the zero-laws using the standard Poissonization technique [13, 14] . The idea is that the zero-law for graph G(n, θ n , A) follows once we establish the result with Poissonization; i.e., once we obtain the zero-law for graph G Poisson (n, θ n , A). See Lemma 8 for the rigorous argument.
B.1.2 Method of the moments
We reuse the notation in Lemma 2; i.e., here in graph G Poisson (n, θ n , A), where A is the unit torus T or the unit square S, let I x be the event that node v x is isolated, and D rn (v x ) be the intersection of A and the disk centered at positionv x ∈ A with radius r n .
We use the method of the moments for the proof. Note that n is the expected number of nodes in graph G Poisson (n, θ n , A). By [24, Fact 1 and Lemma 1], the zero-law is proved once we demonstrate
Below we prove (24) and (25), respectively. Note that given condition lim n→∞ α n = −∞ in the zero-laws, we obtain α n < 0 for all n sufficiently large.
B.2 Proving the Zero-Law of Theorem 1
As just noted, we have α n < 0 for all n sufficiently large so we can use results from Lemma 3.
B.2.1 Establishing (24) on the unit torus T
By Lemma 2, it holds that
Since T is a unit torus, it holds that D rn (v x ) = πr n 2 for anyv x ∈ T . Then
Using πr n 2 p s n = ln n+α n −O(1) from Lemma 3 in (26) and considering lim n→∞ α n = −∞, we obtain
B.2.2 Establishing (25) on the unit torus T
By the law of total probability, it is clear that
Applying Lemma 2 to (27), we derive
Here we consider A as the torus T . For anyv x ∈ T and anyv y ∈ T , we have D rn (v x ) = πr n 2 and D rn (v y ) = πr n 2 . Ifv y ∈ A \ D 2rn (v x ) (i.e.,v x andv y have a distance greater than 2r n ), where D 2rn (v x ) is the intersection of T and the disk centered atv x with radius 2r n , then
Therefore, from (28),
Substituting (29) into (27), we obtain Pn ≤ ln n from Lemma 3 and K n ≥ ln n ln ln n by condition (3), it holds that for all n sufficiently large,
Using (33),
Pn ≤ ln n and
ln n in (32), we establish (31). As explained before, the proof of (25) is now completed.
B.3 Proving the Zero-Law of Theorem 2
We will explain that |α n | can be confined as O(ln ln n). To see this for the zero-law, it suffices to show The zero-law of Theorem 2 under |α n | = O(ln ln n) ⇒ The zero-law of Theorem 2 regardless of |α n |=O(ln ln n).
Figure 3: We partition the unit square S into S 0 , S 1 , S 2 and S 3 . Note that each of S 1 , S 2 and S 3 has four parts.
Letting α n be max{α n , − ln ln n}, we define r n through π r It is clear that r n ≤ r n . We write graph G(n, θ n , S) as G(n, K n , P n , r n , S). Then we can construct graph G(n, K n , P n , r n , S) as follows such that it is a supergraph of G(n, K n , P n , r n , S). In G(n, K n , P n , r n , S), with each node increasing its transmission range from r n to r n , then the graph becomes G(n, K n , P n , r n , S).
For the zero-law, we consider lim n→∞ α n = −∞, which yields lim n→∞ α n = −∞ and | α n | = O(ln ln n). If we have the zero-law of Theorem 2 under |α n | = O(ln ln n), then even |α n | = O(ln ln n) does not hold, in view of lim n→∞ α n = −∞ and | α n | = O(ln ln n), we apply the zero-law to graph G(n, K n , P n , r n , S) and obtain that under (5) and (34), graph G(n, K n , P n , r n , S) is disconnected almost surely. Then as a subgraph of graph G(n, K n , P n , r n , S), graph G(n, K n , P n , r n , S) is also disconnected. Hence, we obtain the zero-law of Theorem 2 regardless of the condition |α n | = O(ln ln n).
B.3.1 Establishing (24) on the unit square S
By Lemma 2, P[I x ] = S e −npsDr n (vx) dv x holds. To compute P[I x ] based on this, we partition S in a way similar to that by Li et al. [12] and Wan et al. [20] . Specifically, S is divided into S 0 , S 1 , S 2 and S 3 , respectively, as illustrated in Figure 3 (note that r n < 1 2 for all n sufficiently large due to r n = o(1) by Lemma 4). S 0 consists of all points each with a distance greater than r n to its nearest edge of S, whereas S 3 is the area in which each point has distances no greater than r n to at least two edges of S. We further divide S \ {S 0 ∪ S 3 } into S 1 and S 2 as follows. In S \ {S 0 ∪ S 3 }, S 1 compromise points whose distance to the nearest edge of S is no greater than rn 2 , while the remaining area is S 2 ; i.e., S 2 = S \ {S 0 ∪ S 1 ∪ S 3 }.
For i = 0, 1, 2, 3, we define
Then it is clear that
and (
We explain below in detail that in case (i), lim (24)). To evaluate T 1 , we introduce some notation as follows. For any positionv x ∈ S 1 , we let the distance fromv x to the nearest edge of the square S be g, where 0 ≤ g ≤ rn 2 . Forv x ∈ S 1 , clearly |D rn (v x )| is determined given g; and we denote it by H(g). As used before, we have Lagrange's notation for differentiation; namely, the first and second derivatives of a function f are denoted by f ′ and f ′′ , respectively. It is easy to derive
Since S 1 consists of four rectangles, each of which has length 1 − 2r n and width rn 2 , it follows that
For simplicity, we write H(g) as H. Then
From (42) and H ′′ ≤ 0,
From (38) Using these and πr n 2 p s n = Θ(ln n) from Lemma 4 in (43), we derive
which along with r n = o(1) from Lemma 4 is applied to (41) so that
From (36), we get e −πrn 2 psn = e − ln n ps +ln ln
and with ∆ denoting πr n 2 p s n (note that ∆ = Θ(ln n) from Lemma 4),
Then using (45) and (46) in (44), it follows that
From ∆ = Θ(ln n) and ln 
B.3.2 Establishing (25) on the unit square S
Clearly, (27) and (28) still hold. Here we consider the network area A as the unit square S. For anyv x ∈ S and anyv y ∈ S, we have |D rn (v x ) ∩ D rn (v y )| ≤ πr n 2 , which is applied to (28) so that
where we use the result that S e −nps|Dr n (vx)| dv x and S e −nps|Dr n (vy)| dv y both equal P[I x ] in the last step of (47). Then using (47) in (27), we obtain Since (32) also holds here, we know from (32) and (48) that the proof of (25) on S is completed once we prove
Under (5) with ν n = o(1), we have Then (49) is proved, completing the proof of (25) on S.
C. ESTABLISHING THE ONE-LAWS
From (5), we have
ln n . Therefore, in view that all conditions of Lemma 11 are satisfied, and considering that connectivity is a monotone increasing graph property, we apply Lemma 11 to obtain for some p n with (23),
Here we also define ν n through (22). We will show that under (5) and (6), ν n specified in (22) of Lemma 10 equals α n ± O(1), where α n is set in (6).
In order to assess ν n , we see from (22) that it is useful to evaluate ln 1 pn and ln ln 1 pn . Given (23), we obtain
and with
By (23), it holds that
so we have
Now it is ready to compute ν n according to (22) . On the one hand, for
which is equivalent to p n = ω 1 n 1/3 ln n in view of (54), we apply (22) (52) and (53) to derive
On the other hand, for (55), we use (22) (52) and (53) to obtain
Summarizing (57) and (59), with (5) and (6), ν n defined in (22) equals α n ± O(1) specified in (6). Then by Lemmas 10 and 11, the result follows.
D. ESTABLISHING THE LEMMAS
D.1 The Proof of Lemma 2
When node v x is at positionv x , the number of nodes within area D rn (v x ) follows a Poisson distribution with mean nD rn (v x ); and to have an edge with v x in graph G Poisson (n, θ n , A), a node not only has to be within a D rn (v x ) but also has to share at least a key with node v x . Then by Lemma 1, the number of nodes neighboring to v x atv x follows a Poisson distribution with mean np s |D rn (v x )|; and the probability that such number is 0 equals e −nps|Dr n (vx)| . Integratingv x over A, we derive the probability that node v x is isolated (i.e., P[I x ]) via
namely, (15) follows. Below we demonstrate (16) and (17). For the ease of explanation, we define
as the event that
• nodes v x and v y are at positionsv x andv y , respectively;
• and v x and v y share a certain number u of keys, where u = 0, 1, . . . , K n .
we further define N (E) as the number of nodes different from v x and v y , and neighboring to at least one of v x and v y . By Lemma 1, N (E) follows a Poisson distribution with mean
which we denote by λv x ,vy,u below.
Conditioning on E (v x atv x )∩ (v y atv y )∩ (|S xy | = u) , event I x ∩ I y (i.e., the event that nodes v x and v y are both isolated) is equivalent to N (E) ∩ E xy . Conditioning on event (|S xy | = u), for event E xy to occur, the distance between v x atv x and v y atv y has to be greater than distance r n for u = 1, 2, . . . , K n ; and there is no such requirement for u = 0 as (|S xy | = 0) already implies E xy . Therefore, we obtain
where λv x ,vy,0 stands for λv x ,vy,u when u = 0; and for u = 1, 2, . . . , K n ,
• ifv x andv y has a distance greater than r n , then
• and ifv x andv y has a distance no greater than distance r n , then
For u = 0, 1, . . . , K n , integrating
withv x over A andv y also over A, we then obtain P I x ∩ I y | (|S xy | = u) . Hence, in view of (61-63), it is easy to establish
To evaluate (64) and (65), we calculate λv x ,vy,u below based on its expression in (60). By (60), it is clear that
To further assess (66), we have the following observations. To begin with,
Each of K xj and K yj is independent of (|S xy | = u), but K xj ∩ K yj is not independent of (|S xy | = u). Clearly,
We also recall
Then we use (67-70) in (66) to derive
Substituting (71) into (64) and (65), we establish (16) and (17), respectively.
D.2 The Proof of Lemma 3
Given (4) and α n < 0, we obtain πr n 2 · Kn 2 Pn ·n ≤ ln n, which together with Pn · n ≤ ln n, we obtain
D.3 The Proof of Lemma 4
From c2 2 ln n n c 3 (1) and (2), there exists ϕ n with lim n→∞ ϕ n = 1 such that
ln n . Then ln(n/p s ) ≤ (1 + c 3 ) ln n − ln ln n − ln ϕ n − 2 ln c 2 and ln(n/p s ) ≥ ln n + ln ln n − 2 ln ν n hold, leading to ln(n/p s ) = Θ(ln n). Similarly, ln nPn Kn 2 = Θ(ln n). For In order to assess δ n , we see from (18) that it is useful to evaluate ln ln n ln ln n . Now it is ready to compute δ n . In view of (2), clearly Pn ·n = Θ(ln n), (6) and (18) to show that under either
D.4 The Proof of Lemma 5
To begin with, it holds that
By [22, Lemma 7.1] and [24, Fact 2] , it follows that
Applying (1) Pn ) and (73) to (72), we have
D.5 The Proof of Lemma 6
From (26), it follows that
With |α n | = O(ln ln n), we have for any constant ǫ > 0,
D.6 The Proof of Lemma 7
As in Section B.3.1, we partition S according to Figure 3 and define T i for i = 0, 1, 2, 3 according to (35); i.e.,
To compute T 0 , we use D rn (v x ) = πr n 2 for any positionv x ∈ S 0 , and |S 0 | = (1 − 2r n ) 2 ≤ 1 to derive
We present below an upper bound on T 1 . In view of (42), we further have
For 0 ≤ g ≤ rn 2 , it holds from (39) and (40) that
By (76) and (77), it follows that
Applying (78) to (42),
It is straightforward to see
1 2 +c0 or M ≥ n , then given (88), we will prove P[D X = D P ] = o(1) and thus establish Lemma 8 once showing
In proving (89) and (90), with n − 2n 1 2 +c0 < M < n, we consider the coupling C under which G Poisson (m, θ n , A) is a subgraph of G(n, θ n , A).
D.7.1 The Proof of (89)
Event (D P \ D X = ∅) happens if and only if there exists at least one node v i such that v i ∈ D P and
Then there exists at least one node v ′ in V P := V \ V P such that v ′ and v i are neighbors in G(n, θ n , A). Due to V P = n − M < 2n 1 2 +c0 , considering that p e is the edge probability in G(n, θ n , A), then with L denoting the number of isolated nodes in G Poisson (m, θ n , A), it follows via a union bound that
For A = T , we will prove that under conditions (3) and (4) with |α n | = O(ln ln n); i.e., with some µ n = ω(1) and constant c 1 , max ln n ln ln n , µ n · P n ln n n ≤ K n ≤ c 1 P n ln n , for all n sufficiently large, and πr n 2 · K n 2 P n = ln n + α n n , then there exist some µ n = ω(1) and constant c 1 such that max ln m ln ln m , P n ln m m · µ n ≤ K n ≤ c 1 P n ln m
for all m sufficiently large (i.e., for all n sufficiently large) and
in order to apply Lemma 6 to G Poisson (m, θ n , T ). We establish (92) 
For A = S, we will prove that under conditions (5) and (6) with |α n | = O(ln ln n); i.e., with constants c 2 > 0, 0 < c 3 < 1, c 4 > 0 and ν n = o(1), c 2 P n ln n n c3 ≤ K n ≤ min ν n · P n ln n , c 4 P n n ln n for all n sufficiently large, the condition that
Pn ·n 1/3 ln n either is bounded for all n or converges to ∞ as n → ∞, and On the other hand, for , we obtain α n =m · πr n 2 · K n 2 P n − 4 ln P n K n 2 − 4 ln ln P n K n 2 =m· 4 ln Pn Kn 2 −4 ln ln
Pn
Kn 2 +α n n − 4 ln P n K n 2 −4 ln ln
Then with (95) and (96), we use Lemma 7 to derive L = o(m ǫ ) for any constant ǫ > 0.
To summarize, for either A = T or A = S, it always holds that L = o(m ǫ ) = o(n ǫ ) for any constant ǫ > 0, where L is the number of isolated nodes in G Poisson (m, θ n , A). For A = T , we have p e = πr n 2 · p s . For A = S, we obtain p e ≤ πr n 2 · p s . Also, we have πr n 2 · p s = Θ ln n n . Then from (91), with ǫ set as 0 < ǫ < 
D.7.2 The Proof of (90)
Event (D X \D P = ∅) occurs if and only if there exists at least one node v j such that v j ∈ D X and v j / ∈ D P . With v j ∈ D X , then v j is isolated in G(n, θ n , A), which along with v j / ∈ D P leads to v j / ∈ V P and v j ∈ V P (i.e., v j is not a node in graph G Poisson (m, θ n , A) ). This can be seen by contradiction. Supposing v j / ∈ V P , since v j is isolated in G(n, θ n , A), then v j is also isolated in G Poisson (m, θ n , A), contradicting v j / ∈ D P . Then with q denoting the probability that a node is isolated in G(n, θ n , A), it follows via a union bound that 
Given |D rn (v x )| = πr n 2 for anyv x ∈ T , we obtain 
Applying condition πr n 2 p n n = ln n+ν n to (99), we have 
